{"report":{"v":1,"package":"@sebastienrousseau/crypto-mcp","version":"0.0.39","ranAt":"2026-11-16T11:42:03.624Z","install":{"ok":true,"integrity":"sha512-kKzoD83OOODsm5nEQ60rAn/Gal9V0njl4r5+1W0moy6osFwXJP9WuEKXQqDbtFBh0aJpj7Bhw4xesjNzpdeTzA==","deps":9,"scripts":[],"bins":["crypto-mcp"],"license":"MIT OR Apache-2.0","engines":"node >=22.0.0","repository":"git+https://github.com/sebastienrousseau/crypto-service.git","bin":"crypto-mcp"},"start":{"ok":true,"ms":146,"serverName":"crypto-service","serverVersion":"0.0.39","protocol":"2025-06-18"},"tools":[{"name":"crypto_generate_key","description":"Generate a key inside the server: a classical (RSA, ECC, Ed25519) or post-quantum (ML-KEM 512/768/1024 FIPS 203, ML-DSA 44/65/87 FIPS 204) keypair, a 256-bit symmetric key, or an HMAC-SHA256 key. Returns a keyHandle and, for keypairs, the public key. Secret key material stays inside the server; only an opaque keyHandle is returned.","params":["type","modulusLength","curve"]},{"name":"crypto_key_list","description":"List the key handles this server holds, with each key's type and public metadata. At most 64 keys are held; beyond that the least recently used key is destroyed.","params":[]},{"name":"crypto_key_destroy","description":"Destroy a key: overwrite its secret bytes where the runtime allows and invalidate its handle.","params":["keyHandle"]},{"name":"crypto_key_import","description":"Import an existing key from a file in the directory the server operator set in CRYPTO_MCP_KEY_DIR (disabled when it is unset). Reads an unencrypted PKCS#8 PEM private key (Ed25519, RSA 2048/3072/4096, ECDSA P-256/P-384/secp256k1; the type comes from the key) or a raw 32-byte key, as 32 binary bytes or 64 hex digits, imported as 'symmetric-256' (default) or 'hmac-sha256'. Files over 65536 bytes are refused. The key bytes never pass through the conversation. Secret key material stays inside the server; only an opaque keyHandle is returned.","params":["path","kind"]},{"name":"crypto_inspect_key","description":"Inspect and parse PEM certificate, public key, or OpenPGP armored block.","params":["keyData"]},{"name":"crypto_encrypt","description":"Encrypt plaintext with authenticated encryption (AES-256-GCM or ChaCha20-Poly1305) under a symmetric-256 key handle. Without keyHandle, a new key is generated and its handle returned. Secret key material stays inside the server; only an opaque keyHandle is returned.","params":["plaintext","algorithm","keyHandle"]},{"name":"crypto_decrypt","description":"Decrypt and authenticate an AES-256-GCM or ChaCha20-Poly1305 ciphertext with a symmetric-256 key handle.","params":["ciphertext","algorithm","keyHandle","iv","authTag"]},{"name":"crypto_kem_encapsulate","description":"Encapsulate a shared secret to an ML-KEM (FIPS 203) public key (512, 768, 1024). Returns the KEM ciphertext for the recipient and a symmetric-256 keyHandle for the shared secret, usable with crypto_encrypt. Secret key material stays inside the server; only an opaque keyHandle is returned.","params":["publicKey","level"]},{"name":"crypto_kem_decapsulate","description":"Recover an ML-KEM shared secret with an ml-kem key handle (512, 768, 1024). Returns a symmetric-256 keyHandle for the shared secret. Secret key material stays inside the server; only an opaque keyHandle is returned.","params":["keyHandle","ciphertext","level"]},{"name":"crypto_hybrid_kem_encapsulate","description":"Encapsulate a shared secret using Post-Quantum Hybrid KEM (X25519 + ML-KEM, RFC 9180/10024). Returns the classical ephemeral public key, ML-KEM ciphertext, and a symmetric-256 keyHandle for the combined shared secret. Secret key material stays inside the server; only an opaque keyHandle is returned.","params":["x25519PublicKey","mlKemPublicKey","level"]},{"name":"crypto_hybrid_kem_decapsulate","description":"Recover a Post-Quantum Hybrid KEM shared secret (X25519 + ML-KEM) using server-held x25519 and ml-kem key handles. Returns a symmetric-256 keyHandle for the combined shared secret. Secret key material stays inside the server; only an opaque keyHandle is returned.","params":["x25519KeyHandle","mlKemKeyHandle","x25519EphemeralPublic","mlKemCiphertext","level"]},{"name":"crypto_stream_encrypt","description":"Encrypt plaintext using post-quantum hybrid STREAM AEAD (X25519 + ML-KEM-768 + XChaCha20-Poly1305) with anti-truncation protection. Returns base64 ciphertext.","params":["plaintext","x25519PublicKey","mlKemPublicKey","chunkSize"]},{"name":"crypto_stream_decrypt","description":"Decrypt a post-quantum hybrid STREAM AEAD ciphertext using server-held x25519 and ml-kem-768 key handles. Plaintext memory is wiped after decoding.","params":["ciphertext","x25519KeyHandle","mlKemKeyHandle","chunkSize"]},{"name":"crypto_stream_multi_encrypt","description":"Encrypt plaintext for multiple recipients using post-quantum hybrid STREAM AEAD (X25519 + ML-KEM-768 + XChaCha20-Poly1305) with anti-truncation framing. Returns base64 ciphertext.","params":["plaintext","recipients","chunkSize"]},{"name":"crypto_stream_multi_decrypt","description":"Decrypt a multi-recipient post-quantum hybrid STREAM AEAD ciphertext using server-held x25519 and ml-kem-768 key handles. Plaintext memory is wiped after decoding.","params":["ciphertext","x25519KeyHandle","mlKemKeyHandle","recipientId","chunkSize"]},{"name":"crypto_hybrid_kem_multi_encapsulate","description":"Encapsulate a symmetric key for multiple recipients using post-quantum hybrid KEM (X25519 + ML-KEM-768 + AES-256-GCM key wrapping). Returns recipient ciphertexts and a symmetric-256 keyHandle.","params":["recipients","keyHandle"]},{"name":"crypto_hybrid_kem_multi_decapsulate","description":"Decapsulate a multi-recipient post-quantum hybrid KEM key using server-held x25519 and ml-kem-768 key handles. Returns a symmetric-256 keyHandle for the recovered DEK.","params":["x25519KeyHandle","mlKemKeyHandle","ephemeralPublicKey","mlKemCiphertext","wrappedKey","encryptedKey","recipients","recipientId","recipientIndex"]},{"name":"crypto_sign","description":"Sign data with a key handle. The algorithm follows the key: Ed25519, RSASSA-PSS (SHA-256), ECDSA (SHA-256; SHA-384 on P-384), ML-DSA (44, 65, 87, FIPS 204), or HMAC-SHA256.","params":["data","keyHandle"]},{"name":"crypto_verify","description":"Verify a signature against a public key (SPKI PEM or ML-DSA hex) or a key handle (also HMAC-SHA256). Pass exactly one of publicKey or keyHandle.","params":["data","signature","publicKey","keyHandle"]},{"name":"crypto_hash","description":"Compute cryptographic digest (SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512, SHA3-256, BLAKE2b512).","params":["data","algorithm"]},{"name":"crypto_kms_wrap","description":"Wrap the Data Encryption Key (DEK) a symmetric-256 key handle refers to under a Key Encryption Key held by a KMS provider. Only the 'local' provider is configured.","params":["provider","keyId","keyHandle"]},{"name":"crypto_kms_unwrap","description":"Unwrap a DEK previously wrapped by crypto_kms_wrap in this server process into a symmetric-256 key handle. Only the 'local' provider is configured. Secret key material stays inside the server; only an opaque keyHandle is returned.","params":["provider","keyId","wrappedKey"]},{"name":"crypto_audit_cbom","description":"Generate a Cryptographic Bill of Materials (CBOM) inventory from cryptographic identifiers.","params":["algorithms"]}],"toolsHash":"c83e2dd2d53892e053b59715b609f69249a42933fa95c6cb95b1b28ab393eae1","wrote":[],"callsAt":"2026-11-16T11:42:09.495Z","calls":[{"tool":"crypto_key_list","ok":true,"ms":2,"bytes":34}],"host":{"commit":"eaaffffaf52255d1b77dc4aacffdfaf353f0c12c","run":"https://github.com/itsHaddad/bragproof/actions/runs/43857070216"},"network":{"names":["registry.npmjs.org"],"conns":[],"callNames":[],"callConns":[]}},"summary":{"outcome":"started","needs":[],"contacts":[],"flags":[],"tools":23,"wrote":0,"callsTried":1,"callsAnswered":1,"callContacts":[]},"history":[{"package":"@sebastienrousseau/crypto-mcp","version":"0.0.39","ranAt":"2026-11-16T11:42:03.624Z","outcome":"started","tools":23,"contacts":0,"flags":0,"serious":0,"toolsHash":"c83e2dd2d53892e053b59715b609f69249a42933fa95c6cb95b1b28ab393eae1"}],"page":"https://bragproof.smaverk.com/r/%40sebastienrousseau/crypto-mcp"}